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Comments on Tim Lyons: Exploring the Prospects for a Purely Axiological 
Realism 
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Let me first see if I can summarize Tim’s view (some of this comes from his 2005 
Toward a Purely Axiological Scientific Realism): 
  
1. None of the various epistemic realist claims about what we are justified in 
believing about successful scientific theories work due to the presence 
of historical counterexamples. 
2. But if so we lack reason to believe the corresponding descriptive semantic 
claims about what is true about successful theories as well as their 
corresponding descriptive syntactic claims about what successor 
theories retain from their predecessors. 
3. But this does not mean that we should reject axiological realism, roughly 
the view that science aims at truth, because one can be justified in 
having an aim even if one is never justified in believing that one has 
attained it. 
4. But this is possible only if we can identify certain necessary conditions for 
the attainment of progress towards our ideal aim, some of which also 
have value in themselves that can account for the utility of the pursuit 
of a utopian aim, one we can never know we’ve attained.  
5. But given all this the aim of science must be some subset of truth for 
which such necessary conditions (some with intrinsic value) can be 
specified and towards which it can plausibly be maintained science has 
been endeavoring in its history. 
6. The subset of truth towards which science aims (and has presumably been 
aiming) is the increase of experientially concretized (XT) truths in 
theory-complexes. 
7. Theory-complexes are sets of theories + auxiliaries needed to generate 
predictions, tests and reports from them. 
8. XT truths are true statements that enter into reports of specific experiences 
or in tested statements about the world of experience. 
9.  Specifically, they are not truths that are detached from the complex or 
conjoined in such a way that they are vacuous and can make no 
difference to the world of experience.    
10. Axiological realism thus appropriately modified becomes independent of 
the debate over epistemic realism; its justification lies elsewhere (in 4 
above.) 
11. But the debate concerning epistemic realism has led to a succession of 
descriptive content-retention hypotheses that can in principle be 
ranked according to the quantity of historical counter-examples. 
12. This is useful because it provides evidence for a descriptive view about 
the nature of scientific inquiry (also independent of the epistemic 
issues from which it arose) according to which theory change has been 
historically governed by the application of not one but a prioritized 
distribution of content-retention hypotheses (e.g., retain the 
predecessor’s classification of phenomena, mathematical structure, 
manipulated posited entities, deployed constituents, non-deployed 
constituents, etc.) 
13. And this prioritized list of content-retention hypotheses can be combined 
with a prioritized list of theoretical virtues that are necessary 
conditions for achievement on IncXT (e.g. an increase in empirical 
accuracy and consistency, an increase in or retention of BOS, TST, 
SIMP, etc.) 
14. The result is a descriptive view of the nature of scientific inquiry with the 
following characteristics 
a. It is grounded in axiological rather than epistemic realism 
b. It emphasizes flexibility in theorizing 
c. It combines content-retention principles with non-empirical 
theoretical virtue principles. 
d. From it inference to the best explanation follows. 
e. It is testable. 
f. It responds to the historical challenge to realism as a modus tollens 
rather than as a pessimistic induction.    
 
Can you be more specific about the connection between your content-retention 
and theoretical virtue priorities and the nature of inference to the best 
explanation? How is it that IBE follows from these? Are you saying that your 
view provides a better grounding of IBE as a mode of inductive inference or 
gives it more substance (a clearer understanding of what is better and why it is 
better?)  
 
What’s the nature of the modus tollens you refer to? You say that it falsifies the 
Type-D semantic meta-hypothesis “Successful theories are approximately true”. 
So is this it? “If successful theories are approximately true then successful 
theories a, b, c …n should be approximately true. But its not the case that 
successful theories a, b, c … n are approximately true, so its not the case that 
successful theories are approximately true.”  But reading “all” as the quantifier 
this just leads to “Some successful theories are not approximately true” which 
needn’t trouble the realist much if most of them are. So why can’t the type-D 
meta-hypothesis still be probably correct? In which case we are back to the 
pessimistic induction argument it seems. 
 
In a similar vein, what’s the argument that the epistemic realist needs to defend a 
universal type-D content retention meta-hypothesis, one that works in all cases? 
Only, it seems to me, if she says that being approximately true is the only 
explanation of theoretical success. But why must she say this? In any case, trying 
to support a probabilistic content-retention meta-hypothesis would seem to be an 
alternative to a methodology involving a hierarchical ranking of such hypothesis. 
 
Tim talks about Type-E meta-hypotheses (about what we are justified in 
believing) that correspond with Type-D semantic meta-hypotheses (about what 
is true) that in turn correspond with Type-D syntactic content retention meta-
hypotheses (about which sentences/categories/referential expression of 
predecessor theories can be retained by successors) but why no mention of Type-
D metaphysical meta-hypotheses (about the existence of the unobservables that 
successful scientific theories commit to, about what is “out there”)? Following 
Devitt, why not say that at the center of the realist debate is the metaphysical 
question, and that sematic and epistemic (and axiological?) issues are parasitic on 
the metaphysical issue? In any case, it seems like we could (should?) at least 
recognize a similar variety of Type-D metaphysical meta-hypotheses 
corresponding to the various epistemic, semantic, and syntactic ones, making for 
three descriptive levels. And if so, following the logic of this paper, perhaps we 
could take the results of the epistemic debate all the way down (or up) to the 
metaphysical level, with a hierarchical prioritized list of metaphysical 
hypotheses. 
 
If we can’t ever know if we have attained or are approaching our aim, and have 
to rely on the utility argument to ground scientific methodology or inquiry, how 
is this different from saying that the real aim of science is just the attainment of 
those necessary conditions of IncXT that have value in themselves? And does e.g. 
empirical accuracy and BOS really have this sort of value? 
  
